University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Senior Theses

Honors College

5-5-2017

Hindrances to South America's Emergence as a Key Player in
International Business
Sloan Coolbroth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Coolbroth, Sloan, "Hindrances to South America's Emergence as a Key Player in International Business"
(2017). Senior Theses. 144.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/144

This Thesis is brought to you by the Honors College at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Hindrances to South America’s Emergence as a Key Player in
International Business
By
Sloan Coolbroth

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for
Graduation with Honors from the
South Carolina Honors College

May 2, 2017

Approved:

__________________________________________________________________
Dr. Nancy Buchan
Director of Thesis

__________________________________________________________________
Professor Dean Kress
Second Reader

__________________________________________________________________
Steve Lynn, Dean
For South Carolina Honors College

Table of Contents
Thesis Summary...................................................................................................... 3
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 7
Analysis of Wealth Disparity and Poverty Prevalence ........................................... 9
Dependency on Commodity-Based Industries...................................................... 13
Inefficiencies Due to Inconsistent Approaches to International Trade ................. 20
Migration to Urban Centers and Related Issues ................................................... 30
Governmental Corruption Inefficiency, and Setbacks .......................................... 45
Venezuela .................................................................................................. 45
Columbia ................................................................................................... 52
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile ..................................................................... 54
Concluding Summaries ......................................................................................... 58
References ............................................................................................................. 61
Graphs and Tables................................................................................................. 66

2

Thesis Summary
This thesis seeks to explore the variety of inhibitors that have counteracted
South America's ability to emerge as an influential competitor in the international
marketplace. Largely due to political, economic, and societal issues, both a macro
and microanalysis is performed to better understand both the regional and
individual issues plaguing South America. Due to their overlapping nature, it is
difficult to characterize any one particular issue as more pertinent than another.
Therefore, an analysis by issue is required to obtain a better grasp of its
complexity, severity, and impending necessity to overcome in order to capitalize
on the region’s potential international influence.
The thesis begins by first examining the extent of wealth disparity and
poverty prevalence. The Gini Index, a commonly used statistic in the social
sciences, is introduced and defined in order to offer a better understanding of how
South America compares to other regions in the world. The regional inequality
gap is discussed further, and a decrease in recent years is accredited to various
economic shifts that are evident throughout South America. A suggestion is made
that latter sections will offer a more thorough explanation to other factors that
have contributed to the region’s wealth disparity.
The thesis then continues to the next section, which delves into the
dependency of commodity-based industries across South America. In addition to
explaining the extent of commodity reliance, an analysis of foreign demand and
intervention explains how the region has experienced both economic booms and
contractions over the past decade and a half. Several reasons are given to express
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the unsustainable nature of commodity-driven economies followed by analytical
suggestions that can potentially curtail the negative repercussions. Lastly, Chile
and Brazil have implemented several measures to ensure the sustainability of their
economic competitive advantage. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor is
introduced and is used to exhibit the push for industry diversification in South
America.
The third issue analyzed in the thesis examines the inconsistent
approaches to international trade throughout the region and the resulting
inefficiencies it has caused. An explanation of hub and spoke countries sets the
stage for a better analysis of the three primary approaches to trade in the region:
aggressive implementation of bilateral trade agreements, trading blocs, and
passive approach. Relevant pros and cons to each trade position are discussed as
well as a potential convergence of efforts to improve South America’s presence in
the international value stream.
The fourth section explores the extent of urban migration and the related
political, economic, and social pressures it has imposed on South American
countries. Several issues attributed to rapid urban agglomeration are discussed
including the proliferating frequency of urban slums, inadequate infrastructure,
socioeconomic tensions, and increasing rates of violence. This section uses
regionally encompassing dilemmas as well as specific urban examples to
demonstrate the internal struggles that South America is experiencing. An
analytical discussion at the end examines effective measures that have been taken
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to capitalize on the economic and social benefits that come along with rapid urban
growth.
The final section of the paper deals with governmental corruption,
inefficiencies, and setbacks. Due to the lack of one all-encompassing issue faced
by all countries within the reason, a narrowed scope of focus is used by analyzing
Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Prevalent throughout their
institutional systems, inherent corruption has historically impaired the region’s
ability to alleviate socioeconomic tensions, reinvest into social reform, and
establish confidence from foreign investors.
The thesis concludes with an analysis of the issues as well as suggestions
as to which problems should be tackled first in order to ensure regional cohesion
and bolster international influence. This is approached from two different angles,
one from the viewpoint of policymakers’ agendas and the other from
businessmen’s. The conflicting interests and long-term goals hampers the ability
for significant change to potentially come about, and, therefore, threatens the
future relevance of South America’s international affairs.
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Abstract
South America, a region full of economic competitive advantages,
intellectual capital, and a rapidly consolidating population, has experienced a
sluggish emergence into international business affairs. Hindered by a myriad of
historically pervasive and newly emerging issues, the South American region has
been unable to effectively capitalize on its assets and has subsequently witnessed
an economic stagnation. Including, but not limited to, political, economic,
socioeconomic, and societal disruptions, both a macro and micro analytical
approach is used to better understand the regional issues facing South America as
a whole as well as those faced by individual countries. This thesis explores five
principal inhibitors that are prevalent throughout the region including wealth
disparity, dependency on commodity-based industries, inefficient and inconsistent
approaches to international trade, agglomeration around city-centers, and
governmental corruption. In breaking down the ubiquitous obstacles, providing an
in-depth analysis, and offering recommendations going forward, a more thorough
understanding of South America’s current state is apparent. Inherently
overlapping in nature, though, no particular issue can be accredited with South
America’s delay in international influence. Despite the plethora of regional
setbacks, it is evident that South America, with the correct governmental
restructuring, social reinvestments, and economic diversification, has the potential
to reverse course and emerge as a key player in international affairs.
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Introduction
South America, a region full of abundant natural resources, access to
international trade routes, and a burgeoning population, has failed to witness an
equivalent emergence into the international marketplace compared to other
similarly developing regions across the globe. Inhibited by both regionally broad
and individually unique issues, South America’s ability to capitalize on its
intellectual, physical, and capital resources has limited the region’s overall
political and economic influence in international affairs. As a result, five
historically relevant issues can be attributed to the state in which South America
currently finds itself.
Primarily, South America leads the world in regional wealth disparity and
poverty prevalence. With unequal distribution of wealth, limited economic
opportunities, and narrow industry diversification, the income inequality gap
threatens the region’s ability to cohesively emerge. Secondly, the regional
dependency on commodity-based industries, although bolstering an economic
boom during the rise in global demand a decade ago, has since limited South
America’s growth. Due to inadequate investment into alternative sectors, the
increasing dependency on foreign demand, and the inherently volatile nature of
commodities, a current economic contraction has proliferated other regional
issues. Thirdly, South America has witnessed inconsistent approaches to the
establishment of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with foreign
countries. A lack of regional unity has caused a separation between internationally
relevant countries and has limited cohesive efforts to benefit the region as a
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whole. Fourthly, the rapid agglomeration of the South American population to
urban city-centers has ushered in new economic, political, and socioeconomic
issues. With inadequate infrastructure, lacking municipal service, socioeconomic
tensions, and an increasing proliferation of urban violence, the fiscal and social
economic strain on regional urban hubs has stifled the capacity of economic
output. Lastly, governmental corruption and its related inefficiencies and setbacks
have had devastating effects on South American countries. By funneling money
away from investments into social and economic reforms, governmental
malpractice furthers socioeconomic tensions, political mistrust, and foreign
hesitations to invest in the region.
South America, in the midst of global development and increasing
interdependency, has failed to emerge as an influential player in the growing
business world due to political, economic, and social hindrances. The issues
plaguing the region, although individually unique, are inherently overlapping in
nature, thus making the task of mitigating repercussions a difficult feat for South
American policymakers. Derived from a variety of outlets, the setbacks the region
has incurred call for a restructuring of governmental institutions, significant
reinvestment into social reforms, and increasing economic diversification to
ensure a sustainable and competitive role in international business.
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Analysis of Wealth Disparity and Poverty Prevalence
In order to fully grasp the extent of economic influence, it is important to
understand how wealth is distributed and with whom the power lies. The Gini
Index is a widely used statistic in social sciences that indicates a country or
region’s wealth disparity between the rich and the poor. Not only can this index
be used to compare countries within a region, but it is also a vital indicator of how
a region’s social development relates on an international scale.
The Gini Index is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, with a 1 indicating that
all wealth goes to the same individual and a zero suggesting that everyone has the
same income. Although both are theoretically impossible, the scale sets up
extremes to better understand the extent of how consistent a country’s distribution
of wealth is throughout its socioeconomic classes (Lustig, 2015). Compared to the
rest of the world, Latin America, and specifically South America, is a region of
striking disparities in the equality of wealth distribution, access to education,
availability of basic services, and other indicators of equality (Gasparini & Lustig,
2011). According to a study performed by UNICEF, the Latin American region
has the highest average level of income inequality in the world at 0.483, ahead of
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. By contrast, high-income countries mark
significantly lower with a Gini Index of only .309 (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011). By
these numbers, Latin America is, “30 percent more unequal than the world
average,” a concerning statistic highlighting a disruption in socioeconomic
equality that can explain the region’s stagnation in international growth (Lustig,
2015).
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An inconsistency arises, however, with regard to the Gini indices of South
American countries compared to other countries with similar per capita GDP. As
indicated by the smoothed regression line in Graph 1, an increase in a country’s
per capita GDP correlates to a lower Gini index. Despite this trend, South
American countries find themselves with higher Gini indices, or “excess
inequality”, than should be expected for their level of per capita GDP (Gasparini
& Lustig, 2011). This observation raises questions as to what underlying factors
are causing the pervasive lack in equality throughout the region and may offer an
explanation as to South America’s shortcomings in their emergence as a global
player.
Despite the region’s notoriety of income inequality, South America has
witnessed a steady decline in nearly every country over the last decade and a half
(see Graph 2) (World Bank, 2016). Two principle reasons can be accredited with
the improvement of income distribution. The first reason is in response to labor
earnings becoming more evenly distributed. The wages of workers with little to
no education increased faster than those with higher education. This narrowing of
the wage gap can be attributed to increased access to secondary and tertiary
education and therefore a larger share of skilled professionals entering the
workforce than ever before. Further, the number of jobs requiring skilled labor
has not grown as fast as the supply over the last decade leading to a reduction in
the premium previously paid for those employees. On the other end, a
combination of increased demand for low-skilled employees in commodity-based
industries as well as minimum wage increases in certain countries have helped to
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narrow the discrepancy in income. The secondary reason for the narrowing of the
wage gap can be attributed to government transfers. One of the most influential
innovations in social policy, government transfers have not only increased in size
but also have become more targeted towards the poorer, rural regions. Although
still not a perfect system that satisfies the widespread need, conditional cash
transfers provide needed financial resources to families, contingent on their
adherence to certain requirements including regular health checkups and keeping
their children in school (Lustig, 2015).
Due to the reasons previously discussed as well as improved
infrastructure, municipal services, and economic opportunities, the proportion of
extremely poor people witnessed a 50% decline from 25% of the population to
12% in the past 15 years (Lustig, 2015). However, maintaining this continued
decline in poverty is by no means guaranteed. As mentioned, there has been
stagnation in the growth of jobs requiring skilled labor. This, in turn, reflects the
lag in industry diversification in which South American countries are involved in
as they continue to remain dependent on commodity-based industries. Further, the
continuation of slow economic growth will result in increasingly lower tax
revenues (Lustig, 2015). Governments will either be forced to raise taxes or cut
expenditures causing the progress in declining inequality to stagnate or possibly
even reverse course.
Although merely a singular number indicating wealth distribution in a
country, the Gini Index considers a multitude of socioeconomic factors that tell a
story about the underlying influences affecting a country. In order to better
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understand why South America has been slow to emerge as a key international
player, one must first consider the distribution of wealth in a country as well as
the opportunities available to its citizens.
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Dependency on Commodity-Based Industries
During the 2000’s, South America witnessed a boom in the demand for
commodities such as oil in Colombia, copper in Chile, coffee in Brazil, lumber in
the Amazon River basin, and other raw materials (National Geographic, 2017).
Fueled by international economic growth, South American countries were
propelled into a new era of wealth and expansion following the heels of
developing countries, particularly China. Between 2000 and 2010, Chinese
imports of South American products, primarily raw materials, rose by 1,153%,
which was an increase from 1% to 7% of the region’s exports (Wharton:
University of Pennsylvania, 2012). Attributed to rising world prices for South
American commodities and the resulting increase in output, it is estimated that
“between one-third and half of the region’s growth over the past decade” came as
a result (Economist, 2010). Further, because of the vigor with which India, China,
and other Asian economies were consuming natural resources, South America
was relatively unaffected by the global economic downturn with their commodity
prices’ historically high levels remaining unfazed. In recent years, though, a
decline in the exponential growth and consumption of China and similar
developing countries has led to troubling concerns for the sustainability of
commodity-based economies.
Times are changing in South America. The last several years have hit
commodity-driven economies hard as the international demand for raw materials
has begun to wane in previously high-development nations. Constituting 52% of
total exports in the region during the first decade of the millennia, raw material-
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rich South America experienced accelerated growth in their economies by an
average of 4.3% annually. Although South America’s dependency is down from
86% in the mid-1970’s, this does not compare to the figure of East Asia and the
Pacific falling from 94% to 30% over the same time period (Economist, 2010;
Economist 2014). This staggering statistic demonstrates the lack of timely
reaction to opportunities in the developing world that arose as a result of growing
global commerce.
Today, South American economies find themselves in a time of declining
international commodity consumption. As demand has dwindled, South American
countries have begun to experience a consequential downturn in economic
growth. Of all the regions in the emerging world, South America is the only one
currently experiencing an economic contraction. Compared to the deceleration of
the Chinese economy, South America’s growth decline is disproportionately
large. This is especially worrisome when comparing South America to emerging
economies in Southeast Asia that have managed to maintain stable growth rates of
4-5% since 2012 despite having significantly more interconnected economies
with the manufacturing powerhouse (De la Torre, Filippini, & Ize, 2016) What
originally began as a “slowdown in regional economic activity in 2012 turned into
a contraction by 2015” as economic growth turned negative with a GDP
contraction of 0.8% (De la Torre, Filippini, & Ize, 2016; Aceves, 2017). Although
only an average for the region, certain economies were hit much harder than
others. Brazil, suffering from a prolonged recession, and Venezuela, whose crude
oil production continues to decline, respectively suffered a 3.6% and 12.2% GDP
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contraction in 2016 (Aceves, 2017). This comes as disheartening news,
particularly to Brazil, whose categorization as a BRIC nation held a promising
prognosis for long-term growth and threatens its involvement as a key player in
international affairs.
As the reality of an economic growth slowdown begins to set in, reliance
on a singular industry is starting to have its repercussions. This can be attributed
to several reasons. First, there has been a lack of investment into manufacturing
and industrial sectors. Not only are commodity prices more volatile and
unpredictable than those of manufacturing, but a lack of secondary sectors limits
the opportunity to create value and, in turn, capitalize on its premium (United
Press International, 2010). South America’s dependence on China’s consumption
of raw materials has, in reality, created an unequal relationship. Once considered
complementary economies, South America supplied natural resources to China in
exchange for importation of their inexpensive manufactured goods. However, as
cheaper secondary products have flooded South American markets,
manufacturing industries find themselves unable to compete causing further
reliance upon commodities. If China’s growth continues to slow down, a
decreasing demand for raw materials could mean greater trade inequality and
even more harm to South American growth efforts (Wharton: University of
Pennsylvania, 2012). Second, heavy reliance on commodity exports can drive up
the value of a region’s currency, causing other economic sectors to be less
competitive. This excess inflation creates a further imbalance, as other economic
sectors become less competitive resulting in further dependence on the trade of
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natural resources. Finally, and perhaps most alarming, is the issue that the
majority of non-agricultural commodities are non-renewable resources
(Economist 2010). South America is in a state of imminent danger of a digression
of economic influence. Although not limited to these three issues, they portray the
consequences that a commodity-based industry can have in terms of long-term
sustainable growth.
With the future economic outlook in question, a change must occur in
South American countries that had previously turned a blind eye to the
consequences of relying too heavily on non-renewable resources. Diversification
into other industries, specifically secondary sectors, is perhaps the most
impending necessity. Expanding the industries in which South American
countries operate will not only insulate them from external influences, but it will
also create more jobs, open up opportunities for trade with new partners, and
improve the quality of their insertion into the international economy (United Press
International, 2010). Diversifying from a singularly based economy is by no
means an easy task. However, there are various economic strategies such as
investing tax revenue into new business sectors and Research & Development,
accumulating reserves during times of economic surplus, and redistributing
wealth that can pave the way for new opportunities.
This is precisely what Chile and Brazil have begun doing in the past
several decades. Following the boom in Chilean copper prices, the country’s
principal export, the government capitalized on the premium of inflated global
prices by collecting excess tax reserves and creating a stabilization fund that
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equated to approximately 12% of the nation’s GDP. This very reserve funded a
large fiscal stimulus during the global recession to help counteract the volatility of
international markets (Economist 2010).
In addition to Chile’s forward thinking in creating crisis reserve funds, the
country is also known for its emphasis on entrepreneurship. The Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is a worldwide study that measures the extent
to which entrepreneurship plays a part in economic development within individual
countries and regions. Pioneered 27 years ago by the Universidad de Desarrollo in
southern Chile, the university, which began with only 100 students, now educates
nearly 30,000 students in the field of entrepreneurship. Chile, in return, has seen a
spike in innovation with the second highest level in the world only behind
Lebanon. This classification is a result of more than 50% of Chile’s entrepreneurs
introducing products or services that were new to nearly all users and were
offered by few or no previously existing businesses. Further, the level of Total
Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity, a key measure of the GEM, ranked Chile as
the 7th highest country in the world in 2016. Similar in eagerness to create sector
diversification, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru all ranked in the top 10 as well.
High levels of entrepreneurial activity are a promising sign for any given country,
but without sustainable future growth and ease of doing business, start-ups have
little chance of staying afloat. Therefore, Chile’s rank of 8th in the world for
generating six or more jobs within five years demonstrates the ability to generate
new employment, diversity industries, and create sustainable businesses (Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2017). Further, in 2010, Chile began a program that
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offers $40,000 grants to bring 25 entrepreneurs from the United States to “live
and work on a new venture there for up to six months” (Farrell, 2010). Once a
primarily commodity-dependent nation, Chile is going to extensive efforts to
counteract the transition in global demand for its natural resources. By investing
heavily into entrepreneurial start-ups and ventures, the country is creating a
sustainable environment for innovation that will hopefully carry Chile into a new
era as an influential player in global affairs.
Brazil, on the other hand, is a large agricultural producer that set up an
initiative in the mid-1970’s to invest heavily into its green revolution of plant and
animal genetic modification. Since the founding of this initiative, only 20% more
agricultural land has come into use while a 150% increase in production has since
made Brazil the world’s largest exporter of coffee, tobacco, sugar, beef, and
chicken, among others (Economist 2010). The growth of these various industries
became evermore important in the early 2000’s when Brazil’s cocoa crop, a key
ingredient of chocolate, was ravaged by the spreading of a fungus throughout
South America. Although local economies were initially devastated, Brazil was
able to rebound faster than other countries as a result of the research that had been
done to adopt plant species to the harsh Brazilian climate (National Geographic,
2017). An example of the benefits of reinvestment into further research and
development is epitomized by what Brazil has done. Even though this is not an
example of diversification into different industries, Brazil has capitalized on its
vast reserves of arable land mixed with an investment into more resilient genetic
modifications to assert themselves as leaders in the international marketplace.
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Both countries lead the way within the region of investing into their
futures in hopes of ensuring a sustainable level of growth. Without proper
industry diversification, a decline in global demand of South America’s natural
resources will likely hinder the region’s economic climate. Following the
examples set by Chile and Brazil will offer other South American countries
similar opportunities to grow, foster healthy economic environments, and assert
themselves as key international players in an increasingly global economy.
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Inefficiencies Due to Inconsistent Approaches to International Trade
Gaining political traction in the mid-1990’s, free trade agreements (FTAs)
started to play a larger role in international politics and have since become a
distinctive characteristic of foreign policies in the South American region. While
the main objective of these agreements is to liberalize trade through the
elimination of tariffs and other restrictive trade measures, some also include
provisions for the treatment of foreign investment, government procedures, and
the ease of trade activities and intellectual properties (Mendoza, 2012). The
spaghetti bowl, termed by Bhagwati and Baldwin, was created by “the surge in
the numbers of ‘crisscrossing’ trade agreements which defines a very complex
interaction between different and often overlapping free trade agreements”
(Sopranzetti, 2015). The countries of South America take vastly different
approaches in their negotiations of FTAs and, because of this, issues arise
regarding the overlapping of trade agreements and the inefficiencies that come
from the lack of collaboration within the region. In order to keep up in an
increasingly globalized world, South America must adapt their foreign policy and
unite to create a common trade policy that would allow the region to reach its full
potential.
When discussing international trade and FTAs, a country can be coined as
either a hub or a spoke. To illustrate the differences between the two, take the
example of Israel, which has FTAs both with the European Union and with the
United States. At this time, the EU and US have yet to establish a FTA. Israel,
therefore, would be considered the hub due to its connection with both countries,
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while the EU and US are considered spokes because of their lack of
interconnection (Sopranzetti, 2015). Hub countries have preferential accessibility
to international marketplaces, which provides the opportunity to significantly
increase the number of exports, but also increases their potential risk of facing
overlap due to multiple trade agreements. On the other hand, spokes, which only
have preferential market access with the hub country they are in agreement with,
face significantly more competition. Hubs have the advantage of conducting trade
between countries that have an absolute competitive advantage over others,
whether in terms of cost or selection of goods, thus putting more pressure on the
spoke countries to compete in the global markets. However, in regards to tariffs,
spoke countries have an advantage over hub countries that naturally deal with
various complicated tariff systems, resulting in “a waste of time and effort which
can increase the trade costs and potentially decrease trade” (Sopranzetti, 2015).
Furthermore, spoke countries also maintain the benefit of mitigating unanticipated
complications due to overlap within trade agreements. An understanding of the
differences between hub and spoke countries will set the stage for a better
analysis of the state in which South American countries find themselves in respect
to international trade.
The main concern plaguing South America as a whole is the lack of one
cohesive negotiation strategy shared by all countries in the region. In fact, South
American countries can be categorized into three different approaches towards
international trade. The first strategy, exemplified by Chile, Peru and Colombia, is
characterized by an aggressive approach to negotiating trade accords, typically
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bilateral, with main or potential partners outside of the region in an attempt to
secure access to large global markets. The trade bloc, Mercosur, offers another
strategy, prioritizing negotiations ‘en bloc’, or the encompassment of all countries
within the terms of the agreement (Mendoza, 2012). This strategy emphasizes the
cohesive collaboration within the markets of these countries. Finally, the countries
of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela combine to create a third, but ultimately
inactive, strategy. These countries, “by virtue of their current political orientation
and developmental model, reject the negotiation of free trade treaties” (Mendoza,
2012). Bolivia and Ecuador have maintained some regional trade agreements, but
Venezuela has ultimately renounced all trade accords, within and outside of the
region. This lack of one harmonized strategy has created an inefficient
environment in which to conduct international business and boost regional
growth.
Chile, Peru and Colombia, perfect examples of hub countries, have
epitomized the proliferation of free trade agreements in the South American
region and are responsible for nearly all of the agreements between South
America and third-party countries. Chile alone has signed 21 FTAs and six other
trade deals since the early 1990’s, demonstrating the Chilean government’s
conviction that further strengthening its presence in the international marketplace
will benefit the country’s economy (Wehner, 2011). All three countries hold a
strong economic reliance on their commodity-based export sectors, which
explains the low levels of opposition towards entering new bilateral trade accords
as well as the recognition of a necessity to create international ties in order to
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propel themselves into the global marketplace. The three governments have
similarly positioned their trade policies to target powerhouse economies and
strengthen their economic relationships with current and potential trading partners
in order to secure access to major global markets.
The negotiation strategies of all three aforementioned countries, mainly
Chile and Peru, prioritize Asia because of its importance to the trading market of
South America as a whole (Mendoza, 2012). While this creation of strong
international trading ties initially appears to positively affect South America and
encourage foreign direct investment in the region, under further examination it
seems to be more of a double-edged sword. The dependency on Asian countries
as trading partners fosters the commodity-based nature of its export sector and
allows for South American markets to be flooded with cheap manufactured goods.
This could not only threaten South American GDP’s as Asia’s economic growth
continues to decline, but it could also prevent small businesses from entering the
competitive marketplace, leading to a lack of diversification in industry sectors.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has also caused complications among
international trade policies of South America. This agreement would unite twelve,
Pacific-lined nations that made up approximately 40% of the world’s economy
into one regional trade accord (Baker, 2017). Chile and Peru, both involved in the
negotiations of the TPP, are hopeful that its implementation will provide them the
ability “to attract investment and insert themselves into global value chains in
manufacturing and other commerce” (Wilson, 2015). Both countries, in addition
to Colombia, which is likely for future inclusion in the TPP, are attempting to
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diversify their economies, and the TPP would provide a strong opportunity for
just that. The execution of the TPP would benefit the countries by consolidating
some of their current bilateral trade accords into one cohesive agreement.
However, just one day into his term, President Trump formally withdrew from the
TPP, ending the United State’s inclusion into what would have been the largest
regional trade agreement to date. While this decision has controversial
consequences for the United States, it is certain that the country’s withdrawal
from the TPP will “hand the keys to China” and allow it to emerge as a regional
leader in South America, filling the void that America has abandoned (Baker,
2017). The timing of this retraction is potentially dangerous for South America, as
an increasing fiscal dependency on countries that are experiencing strong declines
in economic growth could have major implications on South America’s overall
GDP. While the TPP initially provided an outlet for countries like Chile and Peru
to vary their portfolio of industries and focus investments into manufacturing and
other secondary sectors, the withdrawal of the United States implies that China
will dominate trade in the region, limiting the ability of these countries to
diversify their economies.
Mercado Común del Cono Sur, better known as Mercosur, is a regional
trade agreement comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Due to
the nature of this trade group and their regional-based strategies, the associated
countries would all be considered spoke countries. In an attempt to replicate the
successful European Union, Mercosur has unanimously agreed that its underlying
member countries will not form bilateral trade accords but rather will negotiate
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agreements as a cohesive unit. Further, Mercosur implemented a common
external tariff of 35% on certain imports coming from countries outside of the
group members. Initially, Mercosur saw high levels of success. Between 1990 and
1997, trade within the group increased from $4 billion to $20 billion (Renwick,
2016). The intention was to mimic a free trade area similar to that of the European
Union; the bloc even contemplated converting all members to one common
currency. However, the regional growth slowed after Brazil and Argentina each
faced fiscal crises that led to trade disputes between the countries in 2011. These
disputes contributed to a 15% decline in Brazil’s exports in just one year
(Renwick, 2016). Consequently, internal disputes have created hesitancies and
doubt among many foreign players in regards to negotiating with and investing in
the trade bloc. Despite attempts to mock the strategies applied in the EU,
Mercosur has faced major setbacks with its own members that have impaired its
significance in the global economic world.
Another hindrance facing Mercosur is its inability to attain Chile, a major
economy in the South American region. While Mercosur is not currently a major
destination of Chilean exports, Brazil and Argentina together make up the
majority of Chile’s imports, making it a likely candidate for the inclusion into
Mercosur. Nevertheless, Chile chose not to join Mercosur because it did not want
to limit its ability to create bilateral trade accords, nor did it want to exchange its
single tariff policy for the strict tariff guidelines and regulations appointed by
Mercosur (Mendoza, 2012). Observing a major economy in the continent reject its
inclusion into a free trade area was a major indicator that Mercosur would not see
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the economic success that the European Union has seen. Despite promising
intentions, the overwhelming opinion regarding Mercosur is that it has been
ultimately unsuccessful due to its inability to both achieve a sense of cohesiveness
within the group and to negotiate successful trade agreements with key
international players.
The final strategy observed by South American countries would be a
passive approach that Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all demonstrate. These
countries typically reject the negotiations of bilateral trade agreements and instead
prioritize the protectionism of their internal markets (Mendoza, 2012). Bolivia,
one of the few landlocked countries in South America, has failed to capitalize on
the benefits of bilateral trade agreements. Unlike Venezuela and Ecuador, though,
this is largely due to geographical restrictions rather than political resistance. In
1884, a treaty signed between Chile and Bolivia concluded the War of the Pacific
resulting in Bolivia’s relinquishment of their westernmost territory that connected
them to the sea. Unknown at the time, this territory was rich with natural
resources and has since boosted Chile’s GDP as the world’s largest copper
producer. Although Bolivia is rich in natural gas and the treaty permitted peaceful
access to Chilean ports, Bolivia has failed to see the economic growth potential it
would have if history had been written differently (Woody, 2015). Despite its
geographical hindrances, Bolivia’s hesitant attitude towards free trade agreements
speaks to the country’s delay in global relevance. This political attitude towards
the negotiation of trade agreements has caused Bolivia to find itself in a stagnated
situation with no real overarching trade policy whatsoever.
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Similar to Bolivia, oil-rich Venezuela has failed to capitalize on the
international trade ties that would have alleviated its current economic and
political pressure. Despite a questionable ‘backdoor induction’ into Mercosur in
2013, hopes were high that joining the trade bloc would have improved
Venezuela’s crashing economy. The reality, instead, was that Venezuela failed to
comply with the bloc’s regulations and tariff policies to a point so extreme that
the remaining members of Mercosur agreed to suspend Venezuela from the bloc
in December 2016. This resulted in the country being denied the inclusion of
negotiations currently being made with the European Union, an agreement that,
when implemented, could have significantly improved the country’s current state
of instability (Margolis, 2016). Venezuela has been unreliable in the negotiation
of large region-encompassing trade agreements. It was originally a signing
member of Group-3, along with Colombia and Mexico, before it backed out of the
agreement in 2006 (Mendoza, 2012). Similarly, Venezuela also withdrew its
membership from the Andean Community (CAN) customs union, an agreement
made between countries in the northwestern part of South America. The
consistent renouncing of trade agreements has not only hurt Venezuela’s internal
industries, it has also severely damaged their international relations by giving a
feeling of doubt and hesitation to any country that would consider negotiating a
trade agreement in the future. Venezuela’s struggle to both sustain itself and
compete with international markets has proven that the country’s lack of trade
accords hinders its ability to capitalize on international economic opportunities.
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South America’s lack of one common approach for negotiation tactics is
inhibiting the region from becoming a powerful international force like NAFTA
and the European Union. Greater coordination among the states would not only
strengthen individual economies, but also foster the region’s global competitive
position. Further, it would help to eliminate some of the complex overlap that
South America faces due to a large number of crisscrossing FTAs. The spaghetti
bowl of trade accords raises a concern about potentially conflicting rules and
commitments made by various South American countries, and it is only
increasing in complexity as more and more FTAs are negotiated. This is evident
in the conflicting standards that various trade agreements have created in regards
to the acceptable level of pesticides allowed in agricultural exports (Perales,
2012). An elimination of these overlapping regulations would reduce the burden
on the region’s internal industries and therefore improve their overall
productivity. If the countries of South America were willing to collectively reach
an agreement on trade tactics, inefficiencies caused by overlapping regulations
would be much less apparent and the states would see a potentially significant
boost in their economies as a result.
It is apparent that a greater convergence of the various FTAs in South
America would benefit the region by creating a transparent set of regulations,
which would improve international attitudes about doing business with the region.
Further, the elimination of any overlap would allow for South America to fully
harmonize and become the key international business player that it has the
potential to be. As observed, South America is divided between various trade
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policies, some which prioritize regionalized protectionism and others that prefer
forming bilateral relationships with major trading partners. However, the
consolidation of mutual efforts may be best for the region. The creation of a
successful trading bloc within South America could potentially foster a greater
environment for internal growth that would allow them to strengthen their
manufacturing and industrial sectors while limiting external interference to
debilitate their growth. In addition, if such a bloc was established, cohesive moves
to establish foreign trading partners could offer similar opportunities for the
region to emerge as a whole. The lack of a dominant negotiation strategy that is
pervasive throughout South America hinders its ability to realize all of the
benefits that trade liberalization offers and, therefore, limits the region’s potential
to emerge as a key international player.
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Migration to Urban Centers and Related Issues
South America is a region of stark contrast when it comes to rural and
urban population densities. Fueled by a necessity for better employment
opportunities, more readily available access to basic public services, and the
natural progression towards economic growth, a migration to urban city centers in
South America has been well under way since the mid-20th century. However, the
rapid increase in urban populations has seen the rise of a myriad of troubling
issues that threaten the productivity and sustainability of such concentrated
populations. As urban centers continue to expand outwards and exponentially
increase in density, the fiscal resources of local and state governments are
becoming stretched beyond their reasonable limits of sustainable control. A lack
of adequate infrastructure, inefficient public transportation systems, rapid growth
of urban poverty, and an ever increasing disparity in socioeconomic equality are
preventing South American nations from capitalizing on the opportunities often
associated with heavy urban growth.
The centralization of the South American population is not a characteristic
that has recently defined the current-day region. Since the colonization by Spanish
and Portuguese conquistadors, Latin America has been dominated by a network of
large urban centers, both initially established by indigenous populations like the
Aztecs and Incas as well as new cities created to control the newfound territories
(Muggah & Szabó de Carvalho, 2016). However, as the centuries have passed,
further aggregation of populations around city centers has increased at an
alarming rate as a mass exodus from rural to urban areas has taken place in search

30

of a better life. Today, an approximated 82% of the South American population
lives in cities and is predicted to reach 90% in Brazil and the Southern Cone by as
early as 2020. Further, more striking density statistics are apparent in Venezuela,
Argentina, and Chile where they are already witnessing a total percentage of
urban dwellers of 93%, 92.5%, and 89.3% respectively. (Muggah & Szabó de
Carvalho, 2016; Paranagua, 2012). Coupled with internal population growth, the
migration to urban hubs raises alarming questions surrounding the ability to
sustain such high numbers. Inevitably linked together, the daunting issues that
local and state governments face creates a plethora of obstacles that are causing a
strain on fiscal resources, urban safety and security, and a further separation of
socioeconomic classes throughout South America.
As urban populations have continued to increase, the infrastructure,
transportation, and basic needs to bolster such growth have failed to match the
demand. Consequently, migrants in search of better job opportunities and a more
promising lifestyle have failed to see their hopes come to fruition. The rampant
urbanization in South America, while benefitting total poverty and narrowing the
overall inequality gap by generating economic growth, has led to the new issue of
urban poverty that has been confronted with the aforementioned issues.
Principal of these dilemmas is the lack of adequate housing and
availability of basic services to accommodate such populations. According to
global estimates, there is approximately a “$4.1 to 4.3 trillion annual investment
gap between current urban infrastructure and what cities need” given the rapid
projection of urban growth (Pacheco, 2016). As the urban migration has
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continued, cities have begun spreading outward with large conglomerations of
people gathering in the peripheries where land is cheap, property rights are
ignored, and occupation goes relatively unopposed. Once established, there is
little that governments and law enforcement can do to slow or reverse the course
of shantytown growth. Although a prevalent issue throughout the entirety of the
South American region, perhaps the best examples to portray the struggles are
found in Brazil’s two largest cities, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
Sao Paulo, a city of 21.1 million people, is the fourth largest city in the
world followed closely by Rio de Janeiro with 13 million people. However, the
more startling statistic lies in the percentage of the population that resides in
favelas, the Brazilian term for slums, which approximately measure 40% and 22%
respectively (Kuo, 2016; Forte, 2015). Located around the peripheries of large
city-centers, favelas are typically characterized by their poorly constructed
housing with undependable building materials like scrap metal and wood on
relatively undevelopable land. This land, often polluted by surrounding
neighborhoods or on sloping mountainsides, is subject to the dangerous
possibility of landslides and heightened risks of fires due to the concentration of
living quarters. Further, these illegally constructed communities often lack basic
sewage systems, waste collection services, and potable water that creates a
cesspool of disease, contamination, and unsanitary living conditions for the
thousands of people who call a favela home (Barcelona Field Studies Centre,
2017). An even greater issue of concern is the rate at which the favelas are
growing.
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With limited options for affordable living, due to both the extent to which
urban migration is occurring and the slow rate of development, people are faced
with no alternative option causing favelas to grow at an alarming rate. For
example, over the past decade, Rio de Janeiro has seen a population growth in its
favelas of 27.65 percent compared to the “growth of population in the rest of the
city, which has increased only 3.4 percent” (Forte, 2015). This unsustainable
growth gives rise to further problems that, without proper containment and an
according public response, will cause an untold amount of future problems for the
community and state.
Not only are the favelas’ uninhabitable living conditions an issue for those
that live there, but the communities and local governments in which they are
located are affected by the appearance of such undocumented residents. The
illegal residencies have a twofold consequence in harming the area by
simultaneously consuming community resources while also contributing little
back to the state. As undocumented residents, little can be done about imposing
property taxes or similar sources of tax-derived revenue streams for the
government. This propagates the issue of inadequate housing because the
government, whose fiscal resources are already stretched thin, are limited in their
investment capabilities for additional development projects to combat the
poverty-stricken neighborhoods. Further, in order to diminish living costs, favelas
are notorious for stealing electricity, cable, and other services, known as ‘gatos’,
from both public and private companies by tapping into the service providers’
transporters. (Kaiser 2013). This tampering with electrical currents not only
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compromises the electricity supply in other neighboring regions but also
heightens the likelihood of short circuits and potential fires that can devastate the
favelas.
Similarly to residential infrastructure, investment into basic public
transportation systems has failed to keep up with the ever-increasing demand.
Migrant workers, who come to large city-centers in search of better opportunities
across South America, are faced with inefficient means of transportation due to
their location in the city peripheries. Consequently, increased traffic congestion
on unkempt roads causes shantytown residents in search of employment “to
endure hours upon hours in crowded buses stuck in traffic jams” (Lara, 2015).
More than a crisis that Brazil faces, the availability of competent public
transportation is pervasive throughout the entire South American region.
Argentina, as a byproduct of consumer-induced economic expansion, has
seen a boom in the automotive industry. However, an unequal governmental
contribution into roadway maintenance has only led to increased traffic
congestion. Additionally, Lima, the capital of Peru, outsources their transportation
services to privately held microbus companies. This inefficient system causes an
overlapping, undependable transportation system that is subject to fare hikes and
service beyond the government’s control. Due to the unreliable public
transportation system and inherit roadway congestion, Lima has the highest
pedestrian death rate of anywhere in the region (Lara, 2015). Prevalent throughout
South America, the rapid urbanization with which the region is faced presents
local and state governments with an increasing amount of infrastructural
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demands. The provision of adequate housing, transportation, and basic services
like electricity are issues that are faced throughout the continent and must be
addressed before economic growth and emergence into international affairs can be
wholly capitalized upon.
An additional, often overlooked, repercussion of the staggering population
growth in urban city centers is the further division of socioeconomic classes. As
favelas and similar shantytowns have surfaced, the concentration of economically
disadvantaged social classes around city peripheries has inadvertently created an
urban divide separating the slums from wealthier residential neighborhoods. The
resulting visible geographical separation has not only led to an unequal
distribution of wealth but has also furthered the inequality surrounding
investments into development and infrastructure (Paranagua, 2012).
Consequently, a two-fold repercussion has led to additional separation in urban
equality. First, wealthier neighborhoods, as the primary source of urban GDP and
tax revenue, hold the economic influence to manipulate political actions in their
favor, thus propagating the ever-increasing tensions between socioeconomic class
priorities. Second, the residential communities holding the majority of urban
wealth often outsource their needs such as security, basic services, and private
amenities to third parties resulting in minimal dependence on governments to
maintain their quality of life. Therefore, without a demand for immediate
governmental intervention, the influential wealthy classes lack a sense of urgency
in lobbying for social reform that would exponentially benefit the lower
socioeconomic classes (Van Haeften, 2010). As social divisions continue to
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compound, the increasing imbalance in access to municipal services, employment
opportunities, and regional population density has fostered the rise of violence
and illegal activities in urban slums throughout South America.
Pervasive throughout South American cities, violence is perhaps the most
immediate threat faced by both urban dwellers and governments alike. Home to
47 of the world’s 50 most murderous cities, 32 of which are in Brazil alone, Latin
America is plagued by urban violence that transcends from the over population
and concentration of economically disadvantaged residents in slums. Two key
characteristics contribute to the level at which cities experience heightened rates
of crime. Primarily, a positive correlation is apparent between the level of urban
inequality and rates of violence. Evident throughout this section, greater
inequality causes an imbalance of infrastructure, transportation, and basic
municipal services that leads to a lack of employment opportunities in slums and,
in turn, fosters the likelihood of involvement in illegal, violent activities. Second,
fast-growing cities are much more susceptible to high crime rates due to the rapid
population growth in congested, impoverished neighborhoods (Muggah & Szabó
de Carvalho, 2016). This is a distressing issue given that South America’s rate of
urbanization causes a conglomeration of people with difficult and diverse
backgrounds that, when concentrated in impoverished areas, may be more prone
to violent, divisive behavior.
Leading causes for the propagation of slum violence, drug trafficking and
the inability of municipal police forces to combat illegal activities has fed the
proliferation of security concerns throughout South American cities. The once
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relatively rural drug trade, consisting primarily of cocaine, has since shifted to
urban centers as a byproduct of urbanization and favela growth. More centrally
located than ever, the greater accessibility to domestic and international networks
has made the narcotics trade a significant economic industry throughout South
America “providing hundreds of millions of dollars to drug organizations, known
as cartels” (National Geographic, 2017). Specifically plaguing Brazil and
Colombia, who notoriously endured the terror of the Medellin and Cali cartels for
decades, urban drug cartels pose a serious economic and security threat to both
local and international governments. Foreign governments take a hard stance
against the South American global narcotics trade due to their unfavorable side
effects to economic productivity. Not only are international GDP’s threatened as
money leaves the country by the millions, but the consumption of drugs brings
violence, corruption, and illegal trafficking to foreign shores.
On a more domestic level, impoverished neighborhoods, which cite
insecurity as their principal concern ahead of infrastructure and employment, are
often controlled by organized crime syndicates and local gangs (Paranagua,
2012). This furthers the underlying urban inequality experienced in South
America, as the working class does not enjoy the luxury that middle
socioeconomic classes have to distance themselves from the violence and
corruption that plagues the city peripheries. Domestic governments, often with
limited fiscal capacity to combat the overwhelming growth of urban drug cartels,
are experiencing an increasingly daunting burden of pacifying illegal activities in
slums (Lara, 2015).

37

Sao Paulo, home to over 600 favelas alone, epitomizes the struggle that
law enforcement faces in stifling the distribution of narcotics and related gang
activity (National Geographic, 2017). The task of mitigating violence seems to be
a nearly impossible feat with uncontrollable growth rates compounded by
insufficient physical resources to prevent illegal activities and a consequential
deterioration of policing practices in some areas. This deterioration, a
combination of an increasing need for urban policing compounded with an
inadequate number of enforcement officers, has caused Brazil and other South
American countries to become notorious for “shooting first and asking questions
later” (Lara, 2015). As of 2015, the injustice in combating criminal behavior,
combined with the underlying social class discrimination, caused the mortality
rate of young black males in Brazilian city peripheries to be quadruple the
national average with 63 daily deaths (Lara, 2015). Without proper organizational
structure and adequate enforcement numbers, the narcotics industry will continue
to thrive and, therefore, further the risk of violence, the deterioration of livingconditions in slums, and jeopardize the ability of cities to capitalize on the
potential economic benefits of heavy urbanization.
As disruptive as the narcotics trade may be for internal stability in South
American countries, it does not compare to the issues that the region’s
governments face as drug-related activities transcend beyond their immediate
social repercussions. Often overlooked in the discussion of domestic safety, the
negative stigma that is created as a result of South American drug-related activity
is, perhaps, the most hampering setback to economic productivity in urban
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centers. The negative light through which South American trading partners may
view the ease of doing business and personal safety could affect the region’s
ability to exploit their economic potential. This can be seen through a number of
outlets including a potential downturn of tourism industries, hesitancy for foreign
direct investment, and skepticism surrounding the reliability of potential South
American business partners.
Despite the myriad of setbacks that the region has faced with rapid
urbanization, South America has the opportunity to capitalize on significant
economic growth if sustainable urban development can be achieved. Individually
unique, yet collectively intertwined, efforts to improve infrastructure, provide
more efficient public services and transportation, reduce socioeconomic
disparities, and subdue crime rates will not only improve quality of life in urban
centers but also create a healthy environment to foster more reliable economic
growth.
The fundamental issue, from which all other struggles arise, lies in the
peripheral congestion witnessed in urban slums and the resulting lack of adequate
infrastructure available. According to estimates by the United States Agency for
International Development, “poor or inadequate infrastructure” in the Latin
American region “can reduce urban economic output by 10 to 15 percent” (Van
Haeften, 2010). Between inefficient urban planning and uncontrolled inmigration, Brazil witnesses a housing deficit of over 5.4 million homes, with
73.6% of those in need classified as low-income families (Pacheco, 2016).
However, a reversal of the urban housing deficiency and social equality reform
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promises significant economic growth. According to the United States Agency for
International Development, there is a positive correlation between the percent of a
country’s population living in urban areas and per capita income (Graph 3) (Van
Haeften, 2010). This encouraging statistic gives hope to South American
countries that, with proper investment into urban development, they can harness
their complete economic potential.
A pioneer in the region, Brazil, in 2009, began the Minha Casa Minha
Vida urban development project to provide safer, more affordable housing to its
city-dwellers (Lara, 2015). Since its inception, “the program has already placed
10.5 million low-income people in 2.6 million housing units” throughout the
nation (Pacheco, 2016). This initiative has provided families, previously living in
dangerous and opportunity-lacking communities, the possibility of a new start by
becoming a more contributing member of society.
However, while promising as first glance, there are many internal
problems within the program that draw attention to its progressiveness. First off,
the private contracting companies hired to construct the housing units are
incentivized to do so as cheaply as possible in order to maximize their profits.
Therefore, the companies purchase the most inexpensive building materials and
land available, which is often located in the cities peripheries, thus furthering the
issue of access to potential employment opportunities. Second, the contractors
hired by the Minha Casa Minha Vida program are only responsible for the
building units leaving the cities to supply everything else including sidewalks,
public spaces, expansion of public transportation routes, etc. (Lara, 2015).
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Although the newer housing units are often located in safer communities,
their distance from the cities’ commercial districts does little to aid the
decentralization of low-income families by distancing themselves further from
employment opportunities. Without a similar investment in intercity
transportation to support extensive outward development, Brazil has experienced
an urban population that is willing to pay more for centrally located housing in
favelas than the newer units developed by the Minha Casa Minha Vida project
(Lara, 2015). The internal issues of the housing project highlight the imperfect
system in which South American cities find themselves due to a lack of fiscal
capacity and inherent incentives to maximize personal gains. Brazil exemplifies
the overwhelming task that South America is confronted with as the region
grapples with the challenge of accommodating its urban population growth.
Coupled with a greater availability of housing, a significant improvement
of public transportation, either in quality or cost reduction, would significantly
help urban centers. By both increasing the value of land in city peripheries and
providing greater ease of access to and from employment opportunities, more
inclusive transportation is an immediate need that could benefit South American
cities. To combat the inefficient public transportation system in Lima, for
example, the city has begun the process of constructing a subway system to meet
the demand of urban commuters (National Geographic, 2017). In order to capture
the true economic potential of city-centers and even re-energize the workforce, a
serious analysis of future urban planning calls for a healthy balance of investment
into housing as well as the provision of more reliable services such as
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transportation, electricity, and other basic services. Because, in the end,
improvement of one without the other may only cause further urban disruption
and waste precious municipal resources.
Additionally, the crackdown on urban violence by South American
governments, particularly in slums, demonstrates the extent to which they are
attempting to reverse the negative perception of violence and urban safety. In
2008, Rio de Janeiro established the Police Pacifying Unit (UPP), an organized
task force that sought to improve favelas security by removing powerful drug
cartels, encourage local business growth, and restore a sense of order and safety to
the city’s favelas (Forte, 2015). Met with initial success, the limited physical
capacity of the program became evident due to the lack of manpower to maintain
order. Despite their efforts, for every pacified favela, a new one would surface
with the same struggles as before.
Brazil’s UPP program, although demonstrating an awareness and push for
social reform, is an example of inefficient disbursement of resources. However,
successful efforts to improve urban security throughout South America can be
seen in cities like Santiago de Chile, Bogotá, Medellín, and even the region’s
largest city, Sao Paulo. These cities have incorporated several characteristics into
the law enforcement systems to help deter and reduce crime. First, efforts have
been refocused to providing urban youth with foundational opportunities to avoid
a life of crime involvement through stronger public education systems, cognitive
therapy, and methods of childhood intervention. Second, law enforcement efforts
have been refocused to target specific areas, people, and types of behavior
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(Muggah & Szabó de Carvalho, 2016). In South America, approximately “50% of
homicidal violence in cities takes place in less than 2% of the street addresses”
with only about 0.5% of the region’s population committing 75% of the murders
(Muggah & Szabó de Carvalho, 2016). Due to the alarming concentration of
urban homicidal activity, police forces are able to analyze statistics that can help
them predict criminal behavior, cohesively pool their resources, and curtail urban
violence. Lastly, greater action is being taken to improve underlying
socioeconomic disparities by promoting an attitude of mutual responsibility and
reduction of inequality. This is not done by relocating low-income populations to
remote neighborhoods but rather by fostering a sense of inclusion and municipal
support through the provision of reliable public transit, centrally located and
affordable housing developments, widespread basic services, and even possible
conditional cash transfers to support impoverished families (Muggah & Szabó de
Carvalho, 2016). Through the thorough efforts to suppress violence by several
South American cities, a successful framework has been erected to help the region
reevaluate methods to bring about social inclusion and foster an environment
potential of more promising economic growth.
South America sits alone as the global leader in urbanization. City centers,
which are home to most manufacturing and service-based industries, have greater
labor pools, a larger customer base, and a network of complementary businesses.
Beneficial for urban growth and economic expansion, a greater diversification of
urban industries can also help ease the dependency on commodity-based
industries in South America and offer buffers for fluctuations in the international
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market. Urbanization, in other words, is not only inevitable; it is also a force for
modernization and economic growth. South American cities are melting pots full
of cultural interchange, social movements, innovation, and drivers for economic
prosperity. Therefore, in order to realize the economic benefits associated with
urban agglomeration, measures must be taken to implement innovative policies to
foster a reduction in socioeconomic inequality, offer sustainable solutions for
improved urban living conditions, and apply effective strategies to suppress the
sense of insecurity throughout the region.
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Governmental Corruption Inefficiency, and Setbacks
Since its introduction to the new world, South America has been hindered
by inherent corruption, government inefficiency, and debilitating setbacks that
have since limited its emergence into the international marketplace. Although
pervasive throughout the region, no all-encompassing description can fully
capture the individual struggles that each country experiences on a personal level.
Therefore, to better understand what has prevented the South American region
from truly capitalizing on its myriad of physical and intellectual resources, a
broken-down analysis by country is necessary.
Fueled by corruption and governmental malpractice, a regional
microanalysis is required to obtain a better understanding of the pervasive
political transgressions throughout South America. Without understanding the
history and individual setbacks that have inhibited the region’s ability to
efficiently govern, the complete picture of regional inefficiency cannot be fully
understood. Though prevalent throughout the region, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and Argentina exemplify both past and present governmental
transgressions that have threatened their external relationships with global
partners, shaken their internal societal stability, and created mistrust in the current
political systems.
Venezuela
Venezuela has one of the most notorious reputations in the region, if not
the world, for governmental corruption and internal distress. When Hugo Chavez
won the presidency in 1998, Venezuela’s oil-fueled economy was suffering as a
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result of the Asian economic crisis. On a platform of anti-corruption and
populism, his promise of investing into social programs, providing better
infrastructure, and creating employment opportunities restored the population’s
belief in a government that was for the people, particularly the poor. However,
even though Chavez’s “programs aimed to combat the deeply rooted social and
economic issues Venezuela faced, they were inherently dependent upon the
country’s oil wealth” (Fang, 2017). This reliance on oil would be the foundational
issue that incubated the growth of corruption that plagued the Chavez regime.
As Asian markets turned around in the early 2000’s, the subsequent rise of
global oil prices reinvigorated the Venezuelan economy. To capitalize further on
the surge in oil prices, Chavez nationalized privately owned oil fields and
consolidated them into the state-owned company, Petroleum of Venezuela, S.A.
(Halvorssen, 2017). Through the radical move, the government’s oil profits
skyrocketed from 1999 to 2008 as the price for a barrel of oil increased from $10
to $126, thus providing the fiscal resources needed to fund Chavez’s social
programs (Fang, 2017). Although Venezuela’s economic boom was by no means
a result of Chavez’s policies but rather a consequence of systematic surges in
global oil prices, his popularity continued to grow, which allowed him to evade
public criticism of the pervasive corruption.
In 2002, Chavez was ousted from office when the state-owned Petroleum
of Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) went on strike in protest over his corruption and
stifling control of the industry sector. However, Chavez, through his popular
support and militant power, quickly regained control and sought change with a
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vengeance. He subsequently fired over 18,000 workers, consolidated managerial
control, and actively practiced nepotism to ensure his grasp on the lucrative
industry. To make matters worse for Venezuela’s oil industry, Chavez began fully
nationalizing all oil production and exploration by seizing the assets of foreign
companies like ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. Consequently, from 2006 to
2011, Venezuela witnessed their daily oil production fall from 3.3 million barrels
to 2.7 million (Fang, 2017). This not only had detrimental impacts on key
international relationships with developed nations, but it also limited Venezuela’s
revenue and capacity of oil extraction due to limited physical resources and a
deprivation of technological innovations in oil extraction from foreign
competitors.
The state-run company exemplifies the corruption and inefficiency that
plagued Chavez’s reign of power. The mismanagement of control and incentive to
consolidate national profits not only crippled Venezuela’s industrial competition,
but it set the country on a trajectory towards economic deficits. However, despite
the lucrative rise in global oil prices, the embezzlement of profits hindered
Venezuela’s ability to capture the true potential of social reform Chavez had
promised. Between 2004 and 2014, an estimated 11 billion of PdVSA’s profits
went missing, a likely result of the corrupt, and largely shielded, management put
in place by Chavez (Halvorssen, 2017). Although well intended, Chavez’s efforts
to increase adult literacy, subsidize consumer goods, and invest in low-income
housing developments created an unsustainable system destined for failure as a
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result of the hindered oil industry and the subsequent lack of sector
diversification.
Over the last several years, a global decline in oil prices has reintroduced a
state of instability to the Venezuelan economy. Due to overspending and inherent
corruption, an increasing gap between governmental revenue and expenditures
has created a troubling fiscal deficit that has ushered along several other social
issues (Graph 4) (Fang, 2017). Today, continuing governmental malpractice
coupled with a shortage of basic supplies and a lack of employment opportunities
has been met with pervasive instability and economic decline.
As a deficit between governmental revenue and expenditures threatens
Venezuela’s social stability, their economy continues to plummet as a result of its
dependency on oil. Constituting 90% of the country’s total exports, the continuing
decline of global oil prices combined with massive government expenditures,
corruption, and a crashing currency have experts predicting inflation to rise
1,660% this year, and if Venezuela continues at its current rate, then 2,880% by
2018 (Gillespie, 2017). The rapid rates of inflation have caused a severe
devaluation of Venezuela’s currency to the point at which one Bolivar is now
equivalent to a meager one-fifth of a penny (Gillespie 2015). The issue of
devaluation is experienced on a governmental level as Venezuela has witnessed a
50% decrease in imports from a year ago (Gillespie, 2017). This broadens the
inequality gap as those who cannot afford to exchange Bolivars to US dollars are
suffering from an inability to purchase necessities with a worthless currency.
Further, on an international level, heightened inflation rates are crushing
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American companies with Oracle and Ford Motor Company, among others,
claiming to have lost $111 and $800 million last year respectively (Gillespie,
2015). To make matters worse, Venezuela only has $10.5 billion in foreign
reserves remaining, down from $30 billion just six years ago (Graph 5) (Gillespie,
2017). Without the access to backup fiscal reserves and other sectors to support
the stagnated oil industry, Venezuela could soon be facing default, as an inability
to repay debts and sustain its current level of spending will inevitably render its
economy helpless.
The economic recession following the global decline in oil prices has only
made corruption throughout Venezuela more rampant. Costing Venezuela an
estimated $300 billion during Hugo Chavez’s reign, corruption became common
practice throughout governmental systems and continues to threaten the stability
of the country today (Insight Crime, October, 2016). Not only limited to public
institutions, corruption is pervasive throughout the entire political systems
reaching the upper echelons of law enforcement and government. Last year,
President Nicolás Maduro appointed Tareck El Aissami as Venezuela’s Vice
President. However, after a multi-year investigation by the United States’ Office
of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), El Aissami was shown to have facilitated
narcotics shipments to the United States and Mexico by way of his political
power. OFAC’s conclusions resulted in the imposition of sanctions upon El
Aissami forbidding anyone in the United States from conducting business with
him as well as freezing any American assets. These sanctions were in an effort to
demonstrate that power and influence cannot protect individuals engaging in illicit
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activities for their own personal gain (Griffin, Guerrero, Romo & Zamost, 2017).
Further, former directors of Venezuela’s anti-drug agency, Nestor Luis Reverol
Torres and Edylberto Jose Molina Molina, accepted compensation from narcotics
traffickers in exchange for obstructing anti-drug investigations by tipping them
off about upcoming raids (Insight Crime, August, 2016). This is particularly
troubling for Venezuela as the narcotics trade continues to face limited opposition
by financially manipulating politicians and law enforcement agencies. However,
on a more long-term note, the rampant corruption threatens Venezuela’s ability to
capitalize on international ties as they continue to retreat back into its old habits.
As Venezuela’s economic recession continues to show no signs of
reversal, the country’s dwindling cash reserves are making it difficult to pay for
the necessary food and medical imports to support its population of 30 million.
Shortages of basic food supplies have had detrimental impacts on the struggling
nation as oil-based revenue growth remains stagnate. Due to government
rationing, access to basic foodstuffs such as eggs, milk, and butter have become
hard to come by with people often standing in lines up to two kilometers long to
feed their family for the day (Charner, 2016, Gillespie, 2015). Further, Venezuela
is so strapped for cash that they no longer have the ability to pay for basic
imported goods. Left with only oil reserves that have failed to generate the same
economic revenue as the previous decade, Venezuela has been forced to resort to
bartering with countries like Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago in exchange for
beef and toilet paper respectively (Gillespie, 2015). Consequently, basic
necessities remain hard to come by and a greater percentage of Venezuelans are
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malnourished with an estimated 9.6 million people, one third of the total
population, eating two or fewer meals per day. To make matters worse, President
Nicolás Maduro recently pleading for support from the United Nations after the
Pharmaceutical Federation of Venezuela declared that the country was lacking
about 80% of its basic medical supplies (Brocchetto, 2017). Without a diversified
economy, the continuing stagnation of oil prices and depletion of foreign reserves
will plunge Venezuela further and further into an economic deficit that will only
foster the proliferation of corruption, crime, and the detraction from international
affairs.
Perhaps the most immediate issue that threatens Venezuela’s future is the
past and current emigration of educated and skilled laborers. A country that once
boasted a favorable immigration rate began witnessing a trend reversal following
Hugo Chavez’s seizing of power. Averaging a population exodus of 100,000 per
year from 1999 to 2015, this rate doubled to 200,000 last year with U.S. and
Argentinian asylum requests increasing 170% and 120% respectively (Gillespie,
2017). Venezuela’s myriad of social issues is to blame. Foremost, violence has
become rampant throughout the country with corrupt governments and social
programs doing little to deter abductions, homicides, and the narcotics trade.
Venezuela’s capital city, Caracas, was recently named the world’s most
dangerous city with nearly 120 murders per 100,000 people (World Atlas, 2017).
As food and medical shortages continue to plague Venezuela, obtaining basic
necessities for survival has become a matter of life and death in itself. To further
the reasons for seeking asylum is the short supply of employment opportunities.
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Between a withdrawal of foreign investment and heavy inflation rates devaluing
salaries, the jeopardized future of skilled workers is causing them to leave
Venezuela in search of more promising jobs. This, however, is depleting the
intellectual capital that could have the biggest impact on reversing the country’s
downward tumble.
Columbia
Similar to Venezuela, Colombia is no stranger to corruption and social
movements that have disrupted the country’s progress for decades. When Juan
Manuel Santos was elected President of Colombia in 2010, he was faced with
inherent corruption throughout the governmental system, widespread violence
largely due to rebel groups, and a declining, yet still relevant, narcotics trade.
However, running on the platform of future social stability, Santos has
experienced varying results that may promise better opportunities and
international relevance in the future.
Santos’s war on corruption has failed to come to fruition as governmental
extortion and kickbacks have continued to run rampant. According to numbers
released by the Inspector General’s Office, state corruption costs Colombia an
estimated $7.5 billion yearly, approximately 10% of the 2017 governmental
budget. Broken down, this magnitude of corruption costs each Colombian citizen
an average of $165, or 75% of a monthly minimum wage. Further, Colombia,
whose economy is also suffering from dropping oil prices, has been forced to
restore its budget deficit by ramping up taxes in hopes of maintaining its current
agenda of improving infrastructure, public education, and quality health care
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(Alsema, 2016). Although, President Santos’s attempts to curtail corruption has
seen little success, his efforts to restore social order through the crackdown on
violence may pave the way for increased foreign direct investment, more
promising employment opportunities, and international exposure.
Colombia’s largest internal adversary may not have been economic in
nature but rather by way of a social movement. In 1964, under a communistfueled proclamation of governmental suppression and injustice, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was born. Financing itself through means of
extortion, kidnapping ransoms, and the narcotics trade, the group quickly became
a small army boasting a following of nearly 18,000 fighters with effective control
of as much as 40% of rural Colombia (Brodzinsky, 2017). In its half-century of
guerrilla warfare, a conservative estimate of six million Colombians were
uprooted from their communities and 220,000 left dead at the hands of FARC’s
soldiers. However, a tide began shifting in the 1990’s when the United States,
who had been severely affected by Colombia’s international drug trade,
particularly cocaine, began investing money into the country to combat FARC’s
efforts (United States Institute of Peace, 2017). Now, some $10 billion dollars
from the US later, combined with the radical changes President Santos envisioned
for the country, the once unstable social environment and widespread antigovernment sentiment is beginning to subside.
With his agenda to restore a harmonious Colombia capable of capitalizing
on its true economic potential, President Santos began peace negotiations with
FARC leader, Timoleon Jiménez, in 2012. After nearly four years of
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deliberations, a popular vote on the ratification of the peace deal took place on
October 2, 2016. What was considered to be a shoo-in accord, surprisingly lost
with 50.2% of the populating voting no. Spearheaded by former president Alvaro
Uribe, the ‘no campaign’ openly opposed the lenient repercussions of the fighters
and how it excused rebellious activities at the expense of law-abiding citizens
(BBC News, 2016). However, President Santos remained undeterred, and after
several adjustments to appease opponents of the deal, a new era of peace was
ushered in on November 24, 2016. Following the monumental truce, Colombia’s
second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army, stepped up to the table
to pursue peace talks as well, demonstrating the extent to which President Santos
has gone to reestablish order in Colombia (Casey, 2017). Although the
dismantling of FARC promises a safer and more promising future for Colombia, a
new issue of reintegrating rebels into society poses a concern for politicians and
citizens alike. Despite this, President Santos, who received a Nobel Peace Prize
for his actions, has made significant steps in restoring the Colombia he dreamed
of and should pose as an example for other South American countries to follow.
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
Argentina and Chile, two of the region’s largest economies, have recently
been disrupted by scandals in their highest political office. In 2015, former
Argentine president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, was indicted on charges of a
corruption scheme that rocked the entire country. Fernández, along with the help
of a public works secretary, Jose Lopez, seized and stashed away millions of
dollars intended for public infrastructure. Fernandez, who was admired for her
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social welfare programs, has since received criticism for ruining Argentina’s
economy through corrupt state spending and oppressive trade and currency
regulations (The Telegraph, 2016). Chile finds itself in a similar situation
following corruption allegations that surfaced a few years ago surrounding
President Michelle Bachelet and her family. In 2015, Sebastian Davalos,
Bachelet’s son and the former director of Chile’s sociocultural agenda, was
accused of a potentially illegal real estate trade. Based on alleged insider
knowledge of a proposed municipal zoning change that would have caused real
estate prices to soar, Davalos is suspected to have used his political power to
secure a $10 million bank loan with which he flipped properties and made
millions in a matter of weeks. Although President Bachelet holds fast in claiming
she had no knowledge of her son’s dealings, her approval rate has taken a beating
falling from 84% to a mere 31% (Franklin, 2015). Due to massive public
criticism, Bachelet is struggling to maintain her social reform agendas, which
championed the reinvigoration of the economic sector and advocated greater
equality for the nation’s poor.
Throughout the past several years, Brazil has been making headlines with
a seemingly endless stream of corruption scandals. In 2013, Brazil’s enormous
state-run oil company, Petrobras, came under accusations of corrupt behaviors in
which an estimated $5.3 billion exchanged hands over the course of a decade.
Uncovered in the investigation, Petrobras executives were accused of offering
kickbacks to politicians in return for inflated contracts resulting in greater
personal returns (Beauchamp, 2017). Corruption allegations culminated last year
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when President Dilma Rousseff, who also happened to be a Chairwoman of
Petrobras from 2003 to 2010, was impeached after allegedly manipulating
Brazil’s fiscal deficit to aid her bid for reelection in 2014 (Gillespie, 2016).
However, the irony and portrayal of rampant corruption lies in those who were
responsible for Rousseff’s impeachment. In order for a presidential impeachment
to come about, it must first pass through the congress and senate in which 303 out
of 513 members and 49 of its 81 members, respectively, are currently under
investigation for serious crimes (Bevins, 2016). The corruption scandals that have
plagued Brazil in the last several years have repercussions that go beyond simple
political mistrust. In unethical institutional systems where the wealthy benefit at
the poor’s expense, greater inequality threatens the future cohesiveness of
socioeconomic classes and consolidation of economic efforts to increase Brazil’s
international relevance.
Governmental and institutional corruption is not only limited to struggling
countries throughout the South American region but is prevalent in even the
largest and most economically relevant economies as well. The wide range of
current situations covered by Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
demonstrates that no singular country is more prone to unethical behaviors.
Despite the myriad of economic, social, and political issues that surround a
country, corruption remains a relevant impediment that continues to threaten
greater inequality, social instability, and political mistrust. Although progress has
been seen in countries like Colombia and Brazil, South America will not truly
prosper until the endemic tolerance of corruption is eradicated. Principally,
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politicians and those in power must be held accountable. Whether through stiffer
regulations, greater checks and balances, or a decentralization of authority, South
America must restore confidence in its political system if it has any hopes of
changing its future economic trajectory.
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Concluding Summaries
South America, faced with a myriad of fiscal, political, socioeconomic,
and social problems finds itself in a state of limited international influence. The
region’s restricted industry diversification, inherent political corruption,
inadequate infrastructural investments, and socioeconomic wealth disparities have
perpetually restricted the extent to which the region has been able to capitalize on
its plethora of resources. The inherently overlapping nature of the regional issues
has presented a daunting task for policymakers to mitigate the repercussions and
emerge as a regionally influential player in international business.
Consequently, the overarching dilemma presented to policymakers and
businessmen alike is to which issue future policies and fiscal funding be diverted
to first in order to improve the underlying social stability, economic capacity, and
political influence throughout South America. However, varying short and longterm agendas between the two parties can potentially lead to conflicting opinions
as to the most impending necessity to overcome.
Policymakers, responsible for ensuring social cohesion, generating
economic productivity, and establishing foreign ties, must concern themselves
with both domestic and foreign agendas. An argument can be made for each issue
discussed, but the crisscrossing of repercussions effectively limits the success of
suppressing one obstacle without equal attention to another. For example,
governmental investments into social reforms that provide better educational
opportunities, affordable housing, and safer urban environments will be met with
limited success unless an equal investment into industry diversification is made to
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offer a broader range of employment opportunities. With this being said, perhaps
the most immediate action that will provide the furthest-reaching regional benefits
would be a governmental restructuring that would reduce inherent institutional
corruption. By ridding the political systems of corrupt officials, implementing
strong checks and balances, and creating an ingrained sense of mutual
responsibility throughout society, South America will likely witness beneficial
consequences throughout the region. A crackdown on political corruption and
extortion will not only alleviate political mistrust, but it will also reduce
socioeconomic tensions between wealth classes, provide more funding to invest in
social reforms and industry diversification, and also provide a sense of business
sustainability to encourage foreign investment and trading relationships. Although
a reduction in political and institutional corruption is a step in the right direction,
it will by no means guarantee South America’s emergence as a regionally
influential player in international affairs without similar attention paid to the other
issues plaguing the region.
Businessmen, on the other hand, concern themselves with long-term
profitability, maintaining an economic competitive advantage, and ensuring
continual business growth. Therefore, their agendas potentially call for a
prioritization of industry diversification first and foremost. A broadened
diversification of established industries beyond commodities will insulate South
America from fluctuations in global demand and prices, allow manufacturing and
industrial secondary sectors to emerge and remain competitive, as well as offer a
more extensive network of complimentary businesses to encourage internal
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stability. Again, although industry diversification is a necessity for South
American countries to occupy a greater role in the global value stream, this cannot
be done without attention paid to other pressing issues. Without similar
investment of fiscal capital into wealth disparity reduction, the creating of a more
educated workforce through the provision of opportunities, and a better
organization of urban planning to generate economic growth, South America will
fail to witness a complete competitive emergence onto the international stage.
The confluence of adverse factors results in an overlapping of obligatory
actions that must be taken in order for South America to capitalize on its
economic potential. Without cohesive efforts made by politicians, businessmen,
and regional inhabitants alike, South America will continue to limit its
international influence. Although the regional inhibitors go beyond wealth
disparity, commodity dependency, inconsistent trade approaches, urban
agglomeration, and governmental corruption, South America, in tackling these
issues, would likely witness a reversal of course and emerge as an international
competitor with the capability of stimulating sustainable, long-term growth.
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